oce je ko i krim, prvo invadirat, pa odradit referendum

izvještaj

Stanje zadnja dva dana:
Kijev-sjever:
Rusi se prugrupiravaju na zapadnom klinu. Navodno su napravili rezervne položaje desetak kilometara sjeverno od trenutne linije. Dio snaga su izgleda izvukli u Bjelorusiju, ali ih nisu poslali u Rusiju nego ih drže gore.
Istočno od Kijeva je situacija dosta mutna. Černihiv drže pod opsadom. Prije tri dana su porušili dio mostova na rijeci Snov koja ide od rusko-ukrajinske granice do Černihiva i počeli se ukopavati na zapadnoj obali. Kod samog Kijeva po mom sudu su linije dosta istočno od grada (linja Nova basan-Bobrovitsa, eventualno mogu imati neke isturene položaje 5-10 kilometara ispred) ali Ukrajinci uporno trube da su Rusi praktično 5-6 kilometara od Brovaryja. Koji i kakvi Rusi ne znam.

Sumy-Harkov:
Nakon uspješnih kontranapada prije par dana Ukrajincisu deblokirali Sumy iz pravca Okhtirke. Neke karte to još ne vide, neke nisu nikad ni vidjeli da je Sumy okružen. Rusi su se povukli sjeverno i sjeveroistočno od Sumyja i ukopavaju se. Ukopavaju se i oko Harkova, Ukrajinci su tamo proteklih dana povratili par sela i Rusi su se primirili. Zadnji njihov prodor je bio oko Balakliye, ali tu su se povukli nazad i otad se ukopavaju i premještaju.

Jugoistok:
Kod Izyuma borbe, Rusi pokušavaju prodeijeti dublje i proširiti klin, Ukrajinci klin pokušavaju razbiti, ali im ne ide. Na drugoj strani pro-Rusi pokušavaju prodrijeti pravcem Novosadove-Zarichne-Lyman. Krajnji cilj ovog prodora od Izyuma i ovoga prema Lymanu je Slavyansk. Zasad im slabo ide, ali borbe se pojačavaju. Dalje u Donbassu traju i dalje borbe oko istih otpornih točaka, ali niti su Rusi i pro-Rusi napravili značajaniji prodor, niti su ih Ukrajinci potukli. Rusi su napredovali prema Velikoj Novosilki, te prema Šahtarskom i Novoukrainci gdje su par dana bili mirni. Još nisu pokušali prodor u ta naselja, ali su im došli jako blizu. Izgleda da opet pokušavaju zatvoriti kliješta oko Ukrajinaca u Donbassu. Ukrajinci su povratili nekoliko sela južno od Kriviy Riha, ali imam osjećaj da je to bilo onako usput, lokalna akcija jer ništa dalje nisu išli, a nisu ni Rusi nešto pretjerano reagirali. Oni su trenutno zauzeti utvrđivanjem oko Hersona gdje se stanje smirilo. Normalno i dalje Rusi deru topništvom i krstarećim projektilima.

U Mariupolu Rusi danas glume humanitarce, bar su to najavili. Proglašavaju jednostrano primirje da civili iziđu. Ukrajinci drže najveći dio Primorskog distrikta sa lukom, drže najveći dio kompleksa Azovstal. Ova dva dijela su spojeni prostorom u centru širokim 500-tinjak metara oko gradskih vrtova. Ključni most u centru još drže Ukrajinci i preko njega se vežu sa sjevernim dijelom grada gdje se još djelomično drže pogotovo u industrijskom dijelu. Ovdje je jučer načelnik tamošnje policijske postaje prešao na rusku stranu pa su ga odmah pokazivali i davao je neke izjave. Ne govorim ruski i nije mi se dalo dešifrirati o čemu priča. Slutim da će biti priča o Azovskim nacistima koji su ga pod prijetnjom smrću tjerali da puca na Ruse, ali sad kad su pobjegli on je odmah otišao svojoj braći i skupa s njima će krenuti na naciste do konačne pobjede.

A propos ovog pitanja "koji je Rusiji bio endgame u ovoj situaciji", ovo mi je dosta dobar clanak koji to mozda objasnjava. Da, ne treba podcijeniti mogucnost da je neki vodja skroz pogubio konce, ali pricamo o velikoj zemlji s jakom logistikom i informacijskom mrezom, ne o, ne znam, Republici Srpskoj, pa da ne postoji neki ratio iza papazjanija koje rade.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving way out: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures 1 in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

https://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/netko-je-dronom-snimio-mariupolj-nakon-pet-tjedana-ruskog-granatiranja-razoren-je-do-temelja/?fbclid=IwAR3gaMV0fyvZkb69X2_P-MbInnRF7sirw7gbvKAGNs-24TzmNMqmTsg_MPs 

ovo kako izgleda Mariupolj je strasno, tu nema jedna cijela zgrada

ovo je cisti ratni zlocin ruskog agresora

Rusi ce kao agresor nazalost kaj se tice teritorija u bilo kojem scenariju zavrsteka sukoba biti pobjedinici

s druge strane s kojim su ciljem krenuli, da osvoje i pokore cijelu zemlju, negirajuci joj uopce postojanje, da nametnu svoju rusku vlast, izgubivsi jako puno vojnika, opreme, dobijajuci sankcije od cijelog svijeta, do toga da ce gradove i mjesta koje okupiraju morati temeljno obnoviti, ne znam koliko im je to vrijedilo

uopce ih ne smatram nekim pobjednikom

da ne govorim kako ce ih cijeli svijet sljedecih desetljeca promatrati, i da su oni ti koji su sad i ubuduce prijetnja cijelome svijetu

oni su ti koji su na podrucju Europe napravili najveci rat, zlocine i prijetili nulearnim oruzjem, jedini uz Sjevernu koreju u 21- stoljecu

kaj se s druge strane pomoci zapadu, i svim ostalima koji ce tako razmisljati..s pravom

Analize ruskog napada kod zapadnih vojnih analitičara idu od totalne katastrofe do taktički dobro izvedene vojne akcije.

Ko je u pravu?Još je (pre)rano za komentirat